Split Tallies: A Discrete Certificate Calculus for Auditing Dynamic Ordered Sets in Constant Memory
摘要
We study retrospective auditing for dynamic ordered sets maintained by an untrusted party. A passive auditor watches insert, delete, membership, predecessor, successor, min, and max operations, stores five machine words and a flag, and receives a constant-size public tally record per operation. At audit time the maintainer discloses the claimed live vacant intervals. The method represents order semantics by maximal gaps: gaps are born, cited, consumed, and timestamped, while two hidden field accumulators test equality of the birth and consumption ledgers. Honest executions are accepted with probability one. If any answer in a T-operation session is wrong, acceptance occurs with probability at most (4T+1)/p over one secret field element, against computationally unbounded maintainers. We prove that deterministic and visible-coin auditors require linear state, and that removing the timestamp rule permits an exact replay forgery. A leaf-oriented (2,4)-tree implements the maintainer in O(log n) worst-case time per operation with one extra word per element, and its rebalancing events admit an auditable O(m) envelope over m updates. Checkpoint audits compose with additive error.
正文
We study retrospective auditing for dynamic ordered sets maintained by an untrusted party. A passive auditor watches insert, delete, membership, predecessor, successor, min, and max operations, stores five machine words and a flag, and receives a constant-size public tally record per operation. At audit time the maintainer discloses the claimed live vacant intervals. The method represents order semantics by maximal gaps: gaps are born, cited, consumed, and timestamped, while two hidden field accumulators test equality of the birth and consumption ledgers. Honest executions are accepted with probability one. If any answer in a T-operation session is wrong, acceptance occurs with probability at most (4T+1)/p over one secret field element, against computationally unbounded maintainers. We prove that deterministic and visible-coin auditors require linear state, and that removing the timestamp rule permits an exact replay forgery. A leaf-oriented (2,4)-tree implements the maintainer in O(log n) worst-case time per operation with one extra word per element, and its rebalancing events admit an auditable O(m) envelope over m updates. Checkpoint audits compose with additive error. Authors: Faruk Alpay, Levent Sarioglu Categories: cs.DS, cs.CR PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.13272v1 Comment: 22 pages, 2 figures, 3 tables
标签
- category:cs.cr
- category:cs.ds
- primary_category:cs.ds
- source:arxiv
- type:paper
扩展字段
{
"arxiv_id": "2606.13272v1",
"authors": [
"Faruk Alpay",
"Levent Sarioglu"
],
"categories": [
"cs.DS",
"cs.CR"
],
"comment": "22 pages, 2 figures, 3 tables",
"doi": null,
"entry_id": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.13272v1",
"pdf_url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.13272v1",
"primary_category": "cs.DS",
"search_query": "cat:cs.CR",
"updated_at": "2026-06-11T12:25:43+00:00"
}